

The Revolt Against Prudential Truth (copie révisée et augmentée) (3)

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② 2e copie - - Corrections de CDK. - 21 pp. dactyl.

i.e. différente de
l'article en français
Cet acte semble de
CDK lui-même.

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No 1111

et 1111

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Cette 2e copie
tient compte des
corrections effectuées
sur la 1re copie
et comporte de nouvelles
corrections par M.C.
De Koninck.

"And because"

"very small"

"But he had"

"very"

"And this one"

"the whole one"

"And that one"

The revolt against prudential truth

Because prudential truth is conditioned by the rectitude of the appetite, and because this rectitude is guaranteed only by the moral virtues, the history of philosophy abounds with positions and doctrines which attempt to emancipate reason from its dependance on the appetite as to practical truth in order to sidestep that difficulty *of right action* which each one experiences in himself.

This attempt is aimed more especially at political activity, and this we can readily understand, since political action directly concerns the common good. To maintain that prudential truth in political matters is conditioned by the rectitude of the appetite of the politician implies that the judgment of the politician as such depends, not only on his right disposition towards the good of the community, but, at the same time, on his disposition towards any good in action; that the good politician must be a good man; and that this is an essential condition of the very truth of his action.

Now, if there were a means of determining, by reason alone, a proximate rule which, on the one hand would guarantee truth in political action, and which, on the other hand, would free the attainment or the maintenance of the common good from all dependance on the condition of the appetite of the one acting, it seems that the common good would be better assured.

This attempt might be made along different lines. ^(a) For

instance, we might attempt to establish a political science ^{prudent truth, as all practical truth is not the} whose truth would be practical and which would therefore be, ^{the best of knowledge possible in the sense that it would be} at the same time, a substitute for prudence. ^(b) Again, one might try to assimilate prudential truth to the truth of ^{practical art. Here again, the good-ness of the end would} practical art. Here again, the good-ness of the end would be independant of the goodness of the agent.

^(c) Even more subtly, we might refuse ^{to claim} our present judgments to be true or false in the present, demanding that they be judged by their repercussion in the future and by the factual results they might entail.

In all these cases, the common good would be presented as a sufficient justification of either type of emancipation. There would always be, at least theoretically, a perfectly communicable reason for action: a scientific reason; a reason predetermined by the end; or a reason ^{whose validity could be} ~~which would become in~~ ^{established} ~~intelligible~~ only in the future.

These conceptions might be favored by the fact that they would claim to free man from all subjection to man. The attainment of freedom in society would be independant of the prudence and moral virtues of its members. The common good would lie, somehow, beyond good and evil in the ordinary sense.

In fact, in either one of these conceptions of truth in action for the common good, we would enjoy a kind of science of good and evil. This statement may sound a little astonishing. But I hope the following considerations will solve that wonder.

Prudential truth, as all practical truth, is not the business of knowledge alone in the sense that it would engage only the faculty of knowledge. "The truth of the practical intellect, S. Thomas says, is had in a different way than that of the speculative intellect... The truth of the speculative intellect is had from the conformity of the intellect to ^{what is.} ~~the~~ ~~thing~~. Since this conformity cannot take place in an infallible way in contingent things but only in necessary matter, it follows that no speculative habitus of contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but rather it is that only in necessary matter. Again, the truth of the practical intellect depends on the conformity to the rectified appetite. This last is a conformity which has no place in necessary matter, since they are not the product of the human will. This conformity has place only in the contingent things which can be produced by us, whether it be a question of conduct or a question of some external objects to be constructed. That is why the virtue of the practical intellect regards only contingent matter: in the matter of constructing, art; in the matter of conduct, prudence." (I-II, 57, 5, ad 3)

^Q intellect alone cannot bridge the gap that separates practical truth from speculative truth. Our knowledge alone cannot embrace the infinite complexity of the circumstances in which we act. Reason alone, however rectified it may be in the line of knowledge, cannot be the proximate rule of conduct. The very concrete integrity of the conduct to be

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followed; of that which must be done here and now, depends on something more than knowledge alone. *virt. in comm., p. 6, ad.*

How ought a man to act in given circumstances? The given circumstances, in which this man is himself entangled, are ^{invariable} ~~un~~utterable. The truth of the most practical philosophy remains speculative; therefore, this side of practical truth.

"...Cum sermo moralium etiam in universalibus sit incertus et variabilis, adhuc magis incertus est si quis velit ulterius descendere tradendo doctrinam de singulis in speciali. Hoc enim non cadit neque sub arte, neque sub aliqua narratione. Quia causae singularium operabilium variantur infinitis modis. Unde iudicium de singulis relinquitur prudentiae uniuscuiusque." II Eth., 2, 259. The most exhaustive moral science cannot serve as the norm for the ultimate concretion of this act, for "prudence implies more than practical science; for to science pertains the universal judgment in moral matters; for example, fornication is evil, one must not steal, and other like judgments. Even when this science exists, it may happen that reason regarding a particular act, may be hindered from rendering a right judgment: for this reason one may say that practical science is of little use to virtue, because, even when it exists, man may sin against virtue. But it pertains to prudence to judge rightly concerning singular actions which must be done here and now; these judgments are falsified by any sin whatsoever. That is why as long as prudence remains, man does not sin; from which it follows that prudence is not

of little use but rather very useful for virtue; more than that, it causes virtue itself." (de virt. in comm., a.6, ad 1).

All determination deriving from knowledge alone, even when drawn from experience, remains apart from what ought to be done here and now. Consequently, every example, though apparently concrete, remains somehow abstract; it could not be a true substitute for what must be done here and now. Even when we rely upon another to know what to do here and now, we merely put off the ultimate problem, for even the action of relying on another is inalienable.

Our intellect cannot be infallibly conformed to contingent things. Nor can our reason embrace the infinity of singulars, and that is why, Saint Thomas quotes, ^(Sent) incertae providentiae nostrae. However, does it follow therefrom that the agent may abandon himself to chance? Since one cannot know in advance all the possible obstacles and the catastrophe the simple ^{act} ~~fact~~ of crossing a street may lead to, is it enough to make up one's mind at random? "However, Saint Thomas adds, by experience the infinite singulars are reduced to certain finite singulars which happen for the most ^{part}, the knowledge of which suffices for human prudence" (II-II, 47, 3, ad 2.) If it were necessary to take into account all that could possibly happen; if, for example, it were necessary for me to be certain of reaching the other side of the street before being able to decide to cross, I would never cross the street. "He that observeth the wind shall not sow; and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap." Eccles. xi, 4.

Man proposes, but
God disposes

Opinion is sufficient for action. However, we should not conclude therefrom that practical truth is achieved in this opinion. It could not be this opinion which is the proximate rule of conduct. This act must be good. But the good demands perfect integrity; evil, on the contrary, results from whatever defect. Therefore, for this act to be good, it is necessary that it proceed in me from certitude. If, in performing this act, I am not certain that it is good, most certainly it is not. If it is only probable that this is what I must do here and now, it is certainly not good. (Practical truth is not untruth for being practical.)

Now, it is in what I am here doing that practical truth consists. Not in: This is what I should do here and now; but in: I do it, as Cajetan points out.

A man crosses the street and he is run down. Has he acted badly? That is possible. Another might have foreseen the disaster. Can we therefore say that the first was mistaken? He may have been mistaken with regard to those things which pertain to the speculative judgment of certain data of the situation in which he acted. It need not be certain that he would arrive safely on the other side of the street in order that he be in possession of practical truth. Practical truth may be compatible with speculative error. He might have done all that was required of him in the given circumstances and yet be run down. In the last instance, the circumstances formally involved are entirely his own.

Practical truth is conditioned by the rectitude of the appetite. Conscience is the proximate rule of conduct. This conduct is good only if the conscience is true. Conscience is true only if the appetite is well ordered. Liberty of conscience consists in that as well. No one can substitute pure reason for conscience. To maintain that knowledge alone is the proximate rule of conduct is to deny freedom of conscience. If pure reason, and, therefore, communicable reason, could be the proximate rule of conduct, a man could assume the conscience of another, or impose his conscience on another; conscience could be alienated. In short, it would suffice to appeal to objective truth as the proximate rule of conduct, to deny liberty of conscience and prudential truth. That is why rationalism which is always so prompt to invoke liberty of conscience destroys this liberty at its very root. Of course, liberty of conscience is far from assuring prudential truth. Conduct is good only if the conscience is true; the conscience is true only if the appetite is well ordered.

All this is to say that a political science, as perfect as one would wish it to be, a prodigious knowledge of the experience of the past, and of the circumstances in which a person must act, could never assure practical truth in political action. Take note that I say "truth", for, in the domain of action, truth and goodness are inseparable. The man who "succeeds" in getting out of a difficult situation, some apparently hopeless dilemma, and who saves a whole

and seemingly insignificant
people, or even civilization itself, by means of a small lie,
has not simply committed a wrong; his judgment was, properly
speaking, false; his judgment was mistaken. He has committed
an error in the strict sense of the word.

These are harsh words. They are especially harsh because
they run contrary to our desire for the science of good and
evil. Since in action, practical truth depends on the recti-
tude of the appetite relative to that which is absolutely
good, and since the prudential judgment itself depends on a
faculty which is naturally posterior to it, the empire of the
intellect becomes quite limited, the intellect is conditioned.
But, if reason itself and by itself could determine what must
be done here and now to make an act good, if it were able to
prescribe in advance the proximate rule of conduct to be fol-
lowed in all circumstances — this seems to be the ideal of a
certain kind of casuistry which would dispense with prudence—,
if it were able thus to surmount the infinity of the contin-
gent, to speak the unspeakable, practical truth in action
would be independent of the rectitude of the appetite of the
one acting, or rather the goodness of the agent and his action.
would be assured in advance. That would be the case if we
were entirely the masters of circumstances; if, by our human
condition, we were not subjected to circumstances which es-
cape our control. In that case we would have the science of
good and evil. "L'homme pécha principalement, dit saint Thomas,
en désirant ressembler à Dieu par la science du bien et du mal
que lui promettait le serpent, et qui devait le rendre capable

de se fixer à lui-même le bien et le mal moral, ou encore de prévoir le bien ou le mal qui pourrait lui arriver. Il pécha secondairement en désirant ressembler à Dieu quant à la puissance propre d'agir, afin d'obtenir la béatitude par la vertu de sa propre nature, par cette puissance personnelle dont Eve avait l'amour dans l'âme, comme dit Augustin."(IIa IIae, q.163, a.2, c.)

But the truth of the matter is that man is born into a world that is no more of his own choosing than was his very birth into the world. The circumstances into which he arises, and must move, have not been ordained by him. He has not traced the circumstance which is the shape of his nose nor has he determined the degree of his own intelligence; he has not excited in himself his propensity to anger or to indolence.

Man is born a subject. He will never be able to rule except as a subject. We are not alone in maintaining this doctrine. The political doctrines most opposed to our's, doctrines that are most perverse, do they not subject all our judgments to that invention of human cowardice, which they call the judgment of history.

Man is born a subject. Nevertheless he must be a wise subject since he has a rational nature. There are circumstances which we can dominate and must, some, which we can modify and must: we cannot master them all. Still, in all circumstances, we must act well. In all circumstances we remain subjects, and we shall always be dependent on the condition of our appetite.

The longing for the science of good and evil, the desire to free oneself from this condition of the subject is nothing else than a desire to be, to oneself, universal providence. According to Hegel, humanity has arrived at that maturity where it becomes fitting to appropriate to itself divine providence. This is what is meant by liberty. This is the theme which pervades the doctrines and political practices of modern times. One needs only to read Hegel's Introduction to his Philosophy of History.

The moderation thus imposed upon political action is indeed a most difficult one, especially when a powerful majority is sold on a false liberty, the liberty of doing what one deems necessary to be judged successful in the eyes of men, the liberty of those who have capitulated once and for all before the power of the day of man as opposed to the day of the Lord.

Let us now consider the second form of escape from prudential truth. Most certainly there does exist an art of governing. But the art of governing can never be more than an instrument; it can never be the virtue of the politician as such. If prudential truth were identical with art, the difficulties which separate us from the end to be attained would be, from the point of view of good and evil, absolutely non-existent. For the rectitude of the appetite required in art, does not consist in its conformity to that which is morally good but rather in its conformity to the end which the artisan has chosen and to which he has determined his action. There will be truth here by the simple fact that the work is conformed to the appetite rectified with respect to the end of the art. If there is any defect in the work when compared to that which the artist intended, if he had made a beautiful figure instead of that of the monster which he meant to draw, this defect will be due to a defect in knowledge. The art of a poet is not necessarily diminished when he employs it to form blasphemies. Like murder, blasphemy can be done artistically. The devil is a very great poet. His works are terribly true and dazzling. The good of an art is to found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things made: for the making of a thing passes into external matter, and consequently is a perfection

not of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved; and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand the good ^{of} prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection; for prudence is right reason about things to be done.

Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well; (e.g., that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well); if it were proper to such things to act, whereas rather is it proper thereto to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping; whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man." (Ia IIae, q.57,a.5,ad 1.)

If the virtue of the politician could be reduced to an art, if the politician could alienate his conscience, he would doubtlessly enjoy a certain liberty which the prudent could not enjoy, the liberty of using his art well or badly, the liberty of having recourse to any means which he deems necessary to accomplish the end he wishes. Whether one uses it well or badly, art conserves its integrity as art. If the art of governing were the virtue of the politician, political assassination on a large scale would be a good thing. And since man worships the integrity of art you would only

have to wait the day when it will be proved that without these crimes the public good could not have been conserved, to receive the plaudits of the crowd. Those who are desirous of this sort of integrity have already sinned in their hearts; they have already conceded in their hearts injustice as a means of combatting injustice.

But it is perhaps not necessary to resort to so extreme an example to illustrate this primacy conceded to art in the domain of politics. There has been a lamentable lack or absence of 'plans' in the effort to better the lot of the people. Too many things have been left to chance. Men have begun to take into account the dire necessity and the practical possibility of "plans". They have begun to recognize at last the role which experts may and must play in the common or public good. But in their awe before this possibility, they run the risk of forgetting that political society is not a cattle-breeding farm. It must be remembered that if, as Aristotle has already mentioned, a minimum of material goods is necessary for man for the practice of virtue, it does not follow that men will be good because they enjoy the material goods which are necessary for the practice of virtue. It must be remembered that the end of law is to make men good and not to drag them from the cradle to the tomb. As Saint Thomas says: (I-II, 92, 1) "since virtue is that which makes the subject good, it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the law-giver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated

according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect to that particular government. In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end."

If the good man were the affair of art alone, good men could be produced after the fashion of producing race horses; they would then be the products of the art of "conditioning" such as Aldous Huxley describes in Brave New World. Thus men would be tricked into non ebristy by the non-existence of the matter of the virtue of sobriety; they would be drugged into a state of non-anger; they would make injustice physically impossible by putting everyone behind bars. But, then, "quis custodiet custodes?" The guards, too, should be put behind bars.

In other words, men would be made by depriving them of the very faculty of performing a human act.

that is, **III** which the myth of the future is

created. It is here all is said and all is done.

Let us now consider a third form of escape from the proper condition of truth in action.

There can be no more insidious revolt against prudential truth than that of the myth of the Future, which is essentially a revolt against the unrelenting exigencies of the presence of action. For it is here and now that we must act well. Strictly speaking, a good action cannot be put off until to-morrow — the present putting off until tomorrow must be good. We cannot wash our hands of that which must be done here and now. It is only in the present that our action coincides with eternity. Is it not according to our condition at the present moment that God judges us? There is no justification at all in the judgment that we would make in the future and in circumstances of our own choice.

The escape into the myth of the future proceeds again from the desire for the science of good and evil. The partisans of this myth refuse the responsibility of their actions in a universe that is not of their own making and where they ultimately retain the condition of a subject. They dissolve the present and substitute to it a false tomorrow; simulating the true future they transpose the present into the haze of a future present; the myth of the future then becomes the unique justification for the present.

What is this world which the myth of the future represents? It is, above all, a world which will be made by us, that is to say, a world in which man would exercise complete and perfect control over all circumstances; a world in which he himself would make the circumstances. In short, it would be a world where the practical truth of our actions would be assured by the fact that this world would be entirely within the power of our direction; where, according to the words of Marx, man proposes and disposes; a world in which we would no longer be subjects; a world in which we would have the science of good and evil.

Such is the norm according to which ~~some to which~~ some would wish our present actions to be judged. They wish our actions to be judged only according to their conformity to the actions we would perform in the mythical universe. They wish that our actions be judged right according as they might contribute to the realization of the myth, that is, as a preliminary attempt towards future action. The truth of present action would depend exclusively on its repercussion on the future; its truth would become fixed only by the judgment of history. We appeal, then, to the judgment of history; therefore, not to the present eternity which will be manifest at the last judgment, but to the judgment of the man of the mythical future, of man who makes his own history. The wide perspectives of history would then avenge the goodness of the evil we have done.

Note that this escape into the mythical future does not differ very profoundly from the escape in the past. In one case as in the other, one refuses to accept the responsibility for present action; one refuses to recognize as ours the circumstances in which God has raised us. But again, where one sees in our condition of subject a pretext for revolt, the other finds a pretext for inaction. They would respect their father if he were what they would wish him to be; they would be devoted to their family if the conditions in which they must work were reasonable; they would devote themselves to the good of their country, if the men in power were what they ought to be; they would defend their land if their civil leaders had a correct notion of the common good; they would devote themselves to an intense intellectual life, if they lived in the middle ages. What heroic actions they would perform in a universe of their own concoction, as they have fully demonstrated to themselves in their dreams.

This attitude is manifestly odious. Nevertheless, the active revolt against the condition of subject also has its point of departure in a capitulation, it also engages in dreams, but in dreams which it clamorously imposes on reality. Its action takes its origin in despair.

Indeed, things are not what they ought to be. We read in Ecclesiastes: IX, 11:

"I turned me to another thing, and I saw that under the sun, the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to

the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the
learned, nor favor to the skilful; but time and chance
in all."

Hegel has no difficulty in getting out of this situation.

Here is his solution: "...It is not that which is, which makes
us furious, and torments us, but the fact that it is not what
it ought to be; if we recognize that it is as it must be, that
is to say, that it is not arbitrary, nor contingent, then we
recognize also that it ought to be thus."

How is this idea incorporated in the myth of the future?
Considered in its isolation the present would be the cause of
an irritating desperation. But from the moment we see things
in the perspective of the future, the social calamities and
the murderous revolutions, when we see these in the perspec-
tive of a society growing progressively better, we see also
that things are not as they ought to be because they have
not yet attained their term. It is therefore impossible that
they be other than they are; therefore they are what they
ought to be; but what is as it ought to be, is good; therefore,
they are good. Evil is a pure fiction due to the lack of
perspective. The recognition of its necessity places us above
the division of good and evil. In the recognition of this
necessity human life becomes strictly reasonable; reason is
emancipated; it becomes free from free will and from the ne-
cessity of acting properly. Action, then, becomes good from
the moment that it is recognized as conformed to this neces-
sity. Reason emancipated from the submission to the division

of good and evil will henceforth be able to impose itself on reality. The liberty of reason thus defined becomes the principle and justification of even the most violent revolution.

This revolutionary action brings us face to face with two reasons: the reason of man who by revolting against the exigencies of prudential truth revolts against the Reason of God. Human reason, then, is not content with action in history. It wishes to take over the direction of history itself; it wishes to be radical, that is to say, it wants to be the very first root of human life. To attain this radical condition, to reach himself as the root of himself, the reason of man must have recourse to revolt and destruction, to that destruction which creates the malleable conditions which are necessary for the construction of his absolutely free universe. This reason is the quest for creative power. Does not creation start from nothing?

These ideas appear abstract. Nevertheless, it is time for us to realize in a very practical manner that a generation is being formed, imbued with these doctrines. It has already ensnared powerful nations. These ideas form the substance of communism, fascism and nazism. These ideas are gaining ground even among us.

Let us not try to justify our actions by the myth of the future. The true future is that which coincides with the present and which is not of this world. Do not succumb to the idea that human society is inevitably towards always

better states. This is an abominable perversion of Christian truth. We are traveling towards the kingdom of God which is not of this world.

Against the cowardly optimism of those who have conceded that society is evolving towards these progressively better states and who dare to seek therein a consolation for the violence and pains of the revolutions which accompany their birth, we can oppose texts, the authority of which, in matters of prophecy, is quite reliable, and which have been given to us to read:

"Take heed that no man seduce you:

"For many shall come in my name saying, I am Christ:

"and they shall seduce many.

"And you will hear of war and rumors of wars. See that ye be not troubled. For these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet.

"For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom; and there shall be pestilences, and famines, and earthquakes in places.

"Now all these things are the beginnings of sorrows.

"Then shall they deliver you up to be afflicted, and shall put you to death: and you shall be hated by all nations for my name's sake.

"And then shall many be scandalized: and shall betray one another: and shall hate one another.

"And many false prophets shall rise, and shall seduce many.

"And because iniquity hath abounded, the charity of

"many shall grow cold.

"But he that shall persevere to the end, he shall be

"saved."

"And this Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached to

"the whole world, for a testimony to all nations,

"and then shall the consummation come."

(Matt. XXIV. 4-14)

1-46a

2ème Congrès de l'Association canadienne
des Educateurs de langue française

"Le rôle des universités françaises au Canada"

Monsieur le Président,

Mesdames et Messieurs,

On me permettra sans doute, avant d'aborder le sujet qu'on m'a demandé de traiter devant vous, de vous dire la joie qu'éprouve l'Université Laval de vous voir dans ses murs et l'honneur que lui fait l'Association canadienne des Educateurs de langue française en venant tenir chez elle son deuxième Congrès.

Je regrette avec vous que Monseigneur le Recteur ne soit pas ici pour vous le dire avec plus d'autorité et surtout pour développer avec la maîtrise que vous savez son sujet pour ainsi dire favori, à savoir: le rôle que la culture française est appelée à jouer et joue déjà dans l'édification de notre civilisation canadienne.

L'an dernier à pareille date, nous étions à Ottawa. Et à l'ouverture du premier congrès de cette Association, nous étions heureux d'entendre tomber des lèvres augustes du représentant de notre Saint Père le Pape les paroles suivantes: "Messieurs les Educateurs, vous êtes l'armée de la culture contre l'ignorance, de la vérité contre l'erreur, de la vertu contre le vice. Vous réaffirmez votre volonté de ne pas limiter votre oeuvre au froid enseignement des matières scolaires; mais vous voulez étendre votre mission à l'éducation morale, à la formation des caractères, à l'élévation des volontés, en accord avec les plus belles traditions de l'école et de la culture catholique et française".

En effet, le thème proposé à notre réflexion, l'an dernier, était: "l'éducation catholique et française". Cette année, on veut faire "l'investissement de nos forces en matière d'éducation catholique, canadienne-française". Et l'on me confie la tâche redoutable de vous dire un peu la force que représentent nos universités françaises dans l'édification de notre pays. Vraiment je fais appel à votre indulgence et je compte que d'autres viendront compléter le

tableau bien imparfait et qui n'a pas du tout les caractères d'un inventaire.

"Le rôle des universités françaises au Canada". Bien que le mot catholique ne soit pas dans le titre de ma causerie, je présume que c'est surtout parce que ces universités françaises sont catholiques qu'elles ont un rôle primordial à jouer dans notre pays.

Son excellence le Délégué Apostolique disait l'an dernier: "Messieurs les Educateurs, portez la jeunesse aux sommets de la vraie science, de la vertu chrétienne et de l'honneur civique. Je vous le demande, Messieurs, qui peut le mieux et qui est le plus tenu d'accomplir ce programme dans notre pays, si ce n'est nos universités françaises, parce qu'avant tout elles sont catholiques."

Aussi je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire avec quel souci elles s'appliquent à développer, à perfectionner sans cesse leurs facultés de théologie qui sont vraiment à la fois le sommet et la pierre angulaire de nos universités. C'est peut-être une vérité de La Palice de dire que les universités catholiques valent ce que valent leurs facultés de théologie et j'ajouterais de philosophie, puisque la philosophie est la servante, mais pas une servante facultative dont on peut se passer, la servante obligatoire de la théologie.

Je pense évidemment à des facultés de théologie et de philosophie qui jouent vraiment leur rôle universel et architectonique dans une université, qui influencent vraiment toutes les activités intellectuelles de cette université; des facultés maîtresses dont les vérités qui sont à la base de leur enseignement pénètrent toutes les autres facultés et écoles, non seulement celles qui leur sont plus étroitement apparentées telles que les facultés et écoles de droit, de sciences sociales, de pédagogie, de lettres, mais même les facultés de médecine, de sciences et de génie forestier.

Je pense à des facultés de théologie et de philosophie qui réussiraient à développer, tant chez les professeurs que chez les élèves, une soif et surtout une connaissance des vérités fondamentales les plus propres à rectifier toute activité humaine et chrétienne.

Où nos universités joueront dans notre pays un rôle vraiment important, différent et supérieur, disons-le humblement, à celui de toutes les autres universités, dans la mesure où elles feront rayonner davantage la

foi et l'enseignement catholiques. C'est une mission dont elles doivent être fières, dont elles doivent se montrer dignes, mais aussi dont la terrible responsabilité ne doit pas leur échapper.

Mais pour faire rayonner cette foi catholique, il est un moyen providentiel pour nous Canadiens français, un moyen essentiel que nous ne pouvons négliger, c'est la langue et ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler la culture française.

Les universités n'ont pas d'autres buts que de porter la jeunesse aux sommets de la vérité et de la vertu, mais comme dans notre pays une grande partie de la population possède et exprime cette vérité en français, j'aurais dit pratique les vertus en français, les universités françaises ont un rôle éminent à remplir, qui n'est autre que celui d'être un témoignage français de plus en plus imposant, de plus en plus rayonnant de la vraie science et de la vie chrétienne.

Il y a deux étapes dans l'existence d'un peuple. Dans la première, il doit vivre, résister à l'absorption, conquérir ses droits politiques et organiser sa vie économique. Dans la seconde, il doit prendre conscience de sa personnalité et la défendre contre les infiltrations étrangères. C'est-à-dire qu'au sortir de l'enfance, un peuple doit organiser sa vie intellectuelle sur une base solide et en harmonie avec son caractère.

De toute évidence, il apparaît que nous, Canadiens français, nous avons franchi la première étape de notre existence comme peuple. Après avoir conquis de haute lutte un ensemble de droits constitutionnels et coutumiers qui nous place sur un pied d'égalité avec nos compatriotes anglo-saxons, nous sommes désormais solidement organisés au Canada et surtout profondément enracinés dans la province de Québec. Quand à la seconde étape, elle ne fait que commencer. Jusqu'ici, les idées et les livres n'ont pas eu chez nous une influence très profonde. Aussi est-ce sur le terrain intellectuel que nous devons concentrer de plus en plus nos forces. A quoi nous servirait d'avoir résisté à l'absorption brutale par la force et le nombre, si nous devions subir cette absorption qui se fait par les idées et par les livres? Si nous voulons garder notre physionomie propre, il faut nous hâter de nous faire une vie intellectuel-

le puisée à la fois aux sources de la plus authentique doctrine chrétienne et à celles de nos traditions séculaires.

Or, c'est aux éducateurs qu'il appartient en premier lieu d'assurer la vie intellectuelle de notre groupe-ethnique en formant les élites dont nous avons besoin. On a dit avec raison que l'école, le collège et l'université sont les trois principaux bastions de défense de la culture française chez nous. Malgré les reproches formulés contre nos maisons d'enseignement, nous pouvons affirmer qu'elles ont rempli jusqu'ici avec courage et succès leur difficile mission, dans des circonstances parfois très défavorables.

Il reste, cependant, beaucoup de travail à faire et de grands progrès à réaliser à tous les degrés de l'enseignement. L'Université, pour sa part, est pleinement consciente des grandes responsabilités qu'elle a envers la nation et vous pouvez être assurés, Mesdames et Messieurs, qu'elle n'a rien de plus à cœur que de remplir fidèlement sa mission, non seulement dans Québec mais dans tout le Canada et même jusqu'aux confins de l'Amérique, à mesure que des moyens plus adéquats seront mis à sa disposition. Vous me permettrez donc de vous faire part brièvement de notre conception du problème de la culture française.

L'oeuvre universitaire, en général, est un bienfait inappréciable pour la société tout entière. Des hommes de principes et d'influence peuvent sans doute surgir en dehors d'elle et nous en avons d'illustres exemples au milieu de nous. Néanmoins, c'est ordinairement à l'Université que se façonnent les esprits qui, soit dans l'enseignement, soit dans la politique, soit dans la magistrature et les carrières professionnelles, exercent une part plus ou moins grande et plus ou moins féconde d'action sociale. L'Université, en effet, laisse dans la pensée et dans l'âme de ses élèves une empreinte. Lorsque les maîtres ont su s'élever à la hauteur de leur tâche, et lorsque les élèves eux-mêmes se sont acquittés consciencieusement de tous leurs devoirs, cette empreinte est faite non seulement de savoir technique, mais de curiosité intellectuelle, de probité morale, de distinction de manières. Il se crée ainsi dans le monde une élite qui marche en tête de tous les groupes, et d'où partent les mots d'ordre qui rallient les forces et les exemples qui entraînent.

C'est ce rôle éminemment bienfaisant que les universités canadiennes-françaises se sont efforcé de remplir depuis près d'une centaine d'années au bénéfice de la nationalité canadienne-française. Nées d'une pensée à la fois religieuse et patriotique, elles ont été fondées dans le dessein de porter à leur plus haut degré de développement et de puissance les facultés et les vertus caractéristiques de notre race.

"La race française, disait Mgr L.-A. Pâquet, considérée dans ses traditions les plus pures et à la lumière de son histoire la plus glorieuse, se distingue par un culte d'idéal qui l'honore singulièrement. Sa passion ardente, expansive, pour le vrai, le beau et le bien, lui fait une physionomie à part dont elle ne saurait effacer les traits sans cesser d'être elle-même, sans abdiquer sa mission civilisatrice".

Cette mission, nos ancêtres l'apportèrent avec eux de France et nous l'ont transmise comme un héritage. Nous en sommes investis et intimement pénétrés. En dépit des modalités nouvelles développées chez nous par l'influence du milieu géographique et social, nous avons le devoir de perpétuer l'influence de cette civilisation en continuant de cultiver et de fortifier notre âme française. Il n'est donc pas suffisant pour assurer notre survivance ethnique d'accroître d'année en année le chiffre de notre population, nous avons l'obligation de posséder et de faire rayonner en notre pays une culture vraiment supérieure, marquée au coin du meilleur génie français. Cette culture si haute, si riche de l'apport des siècles, correspond mieux que toute autre à nos goûts latins, à notre descendance Française et à nos croyances catholiques. Il est donc nécessaire que nos programmes d'instruction supérieure s'harmonisent avec ce que nous sommes, avec ce que Dieu attend de nous.

C'est de cette façon que nous arriverons à constituer cette élite intellectuelle, ces compétences qui nous sont nécessaires pour imposer notre personnalité. La formation des maîtres a toujours été le plus sûr garant de l'instruction des élèves. A mesure que le niveau des études monte et que leur cercle s'étend, il devient de plus en plus nécessaire d'avoir, dans le personnel enseignant, des hommes dont la compétence puisse affronter les plus graves problèmes et chez qui la spécialisation dans telle ou telle matière n'étouffe pas le souci des intérêts généraux de la science et de la société. Cette formation des

professeurs ne peut se faire que par la fréquentation des facultés universitaires.

Nos universités canadiennes-françaises ne pourront arriver à former des compétences qu'en créant d'abord le milieu favorable à leur éclosion. Personne n'ignore ce que la supériorité ou la compétence dans le domaine le plus humble exige de connaissances étendues et variées. Elle n'est possible que là où circule une vie intellectuelle intense. Soyons bien persuadés qu'aussi longtemps que le goût d'apprendre ne se sera pas généralisé, n'aura pas fait surgir des travailleurs consciencieux dans toutes les branches du savoir humain, les compétences resteront chez nous une chose d'exception et, en grande partie au moins, une chose d'importation. "Pour persévérer et survivre", disait M. Edouard Montpetit, " pour prouver que nous sommes ceux que nous croyons être et manifester notre personnalité, pour que nous soyons, dans une civilisation qui en partie n'est pas la nôtre, des égaux que l'on respecte et chez qui l'on est forcé de reconnaître des qualités de race et l'intelligence victorieuse: préparons-nous dans le culte de la supériorité".

C'est pour assurer à notre peuple le minimum de prestige nécessaire non seulement à sa survivance mais à sa croissance et à son épanouissement normal que les universités canadiennes-françaises, depuis une trentaine d'années, ont élargi considérablement les cadres de leur enseignement. En outre de perfectionner sans cesse l'enseignement de la théologie, elles ont organisé un véritable enseignement de la philosophie, des lettres et des sciences.

L'Université Laval, pour sa part, a bien l'intention de garder à sa faculté de théologie une primauté qui ne soit pas seulement d'honneur, mais une primauté réelle qui se traduise par une influence grandissante et bien-faisante dans tout le milieu universitaire. Elle veut être de plus en plus ce que disait Claudel de l'Institut Catholique de Paris: "un endroit consacré à la formation parallèle et souvent conjointe de toutes les facultés de l'âme et de l'esprit, où les théologiens et philosophes coudoient les physiciens, les physiologues et les juristes et où l'esprit de méthode, de distinction et de définition qui a élevé peu à peu le magnifique édifice dogmatique de notre foi, répand ses bienfaits sur les disciplines profanes qui prospèrent à son ombre. C'est un bonheur inestimable pour un jeune esprit, ajoutait-il, de savoir dès le commencement qu'au dessus du tumulte et du désordre des événements, au dessus du tohu-bohu des passions et des

opinions humaines, il y a quelque chose de sûr, de beau, de bon, d'infailible et d'indiscutable vers quoi il peut toujours regarder avec confiance et amour".

Les Universités ont pleinement conscience que toutes leurs facultés et écoles peuvent et doivent contribuer au développement, au progrès de la culture canadienne-française. Aussi s'efforcent-elles de ne négliger aucune d'entre elles. Mais personne ne niera que les facultés de philosophie et de lettres ne soient appelées à jouer un rôle prépondérant dans une université bien équilibrée.

Le véhicule de cette culture, la langue française, ne doit-il pas trouver des spécialistes dans la faculté des lettres? Et la substance profonde de cette culture, la pensée canadienne-française, ne doit-elle pas avant tout s'élaborer dans nos facultés de philosophie? Mais pourquoi séparer la pensée de la langue? Pourquoi alors établir des cloisons aussi étanches entre nos facultés de philosophie et de lettres? Au Moyen-Âge, les cathédrales furent l'œuvre de la collectivité, du peuple travaillant sous la direction de l'architecte, souvent perdu lui-même dans l'anonymat de la collectivité.

Me permettra-t-on de comparer à une cathédrale le monument à édifier sans cesse qu'est notre civilisation canadienne-française; œuvre à laquelle les Universités doivent participer largement. Et je vois dans une faculté de philosophie travaillant en étroite collaboration avec la faculté des lettres, l'architecte édifiant avec la collectivité cette civilisation propre au Canada français, pourvu évidemment que cette faculté des lettres attache une grande importance à l'étude scientifique de notre langue et de nos traditions populaires.

L'Université doit sans cesse apprendre du peuple si elle ne veut pas faillir à sa mission d'élever et de former ce peuple.

C'est là un autre rêve de l'Université Laval. Et il semble qu'il corresponde bien à l'un des vœux du Congrès de l'an dernier, à savoir que nos universités augmentent les études philosophiques et favorisent les recherches de linguistique scientifique dans notre pays.

Et pour un peuple qui doit constamment défendre sa langue et ses coutumes, et qui sacrifie même à ces biens supérieurs beaucoup d'avantages matériels, ces travaux de linguistique et de folklore devraient offrir un intérêt

passionnant. Seulement il faudrait peut-être ne pas oublier que l'amour et les discours ne peuvent suppléer à la connaissance en ces matières pas plus qu'en d'autres. Tout le monde sait le vaste champ d'exploration qui s'offre à nos recherches dans le domaine de la langue et des traditions, mais si l'on veut que ce travail soit une contribution à la culture canadienne et même universelle, il faut le faire de façon scientifique suivant toutes les méthodes les mieux éprouvées. Destinée à nous éclairer sur notre propre langue, cette entreprise ne peut-être qu'une entreprise universitaire, mais qui met l'Université en contact immédiat avec le peuple. Elle aurait aussi pour résultat de conférer un intérêt universel aux nuances les plus particulières du parler populaire, en les situant à leur place dans les grands courants de la pensée humaine.

La remarquable combinaison d'une culture française et catholique modifiée par le climat américain fait que notre civilisation exerce un attrait puissant sur les anglophones et surtout les catholiques anglophones de ce continent. Généralement minoritaires chez eux, ils aiment à venir respirer ici un air moins mélangé. Quelle belle occasion pour nos universités françaises de faire rayonner au dehors la foi catholique et la culture française. Ne sommes-nous pas un peuple missionnaire? Et quelle magnifique occasion aussi de nous faire mieux connaître et mieux aimer, de faire respecter davantage de nos voisins certaines de nos façons de vivre et de penser. Nous n'aurons jamais trop d'amis capables de nous comprendre quand nous sommes attaqués. Pour un peuple qui a résolu de rester différent de ceux qui l'entourent et de vivre en bons termes avec eux, cette explication de soi-même est une nécessité vitale.

Enfin la situation privilégiée dans laquelle nous sommes au carrefour de plusieurs civilisations impose des devoirs particuliers à nos universités. Les universités anglo-canadiennes se présentent volontiers comme les interprètes naturels entre les Américains et les Britanniques. Pourtant, il ne s'agit que de nuances. Combien plus complexe est notre situation à nous, et combien plus riche en possibilités, si nous voulons l'exploiter.

Français de culture, britanniques par les institutions politiques, américains de mentalité avec ce je ne sais quoi qu'est l'esprit canadien encore mal défini parce qu'il ne s'oppose à rien de précis, forcés par notre état minoritaire de comprendre des gens qui ne se comprennent guère les uns

les autres, nous sommes en communication directe avec les plus grandes civilisations du monde moderne. Tout cela vient à nous, nous n'avons qu'à l'assimiler. Mais pour assimiler, il faut dépasser. A un certain niveau, cette variété peut sembler un tissu d'oppositions irréductibles propres à engendrer l'irritation et le malaise. Sur le plan des attitudes passives, nous sommes en face d'un dilemme: perdre notre âme nationale ou nous replier dans un isolement stérile, ce qui est une autre façon de perdre son âme. C'est en transposant ces problèmes sur le plan spirituel, le seul plan vraiment humain, que l'on arrive à les résoudre en les dominant.

Ce genre de problème se pose de façon plus ou moins consciente dans presque tous les domaines de notre vie, qui exige une grande capacité d'adaptation. Il n'est nulle part plus évident que dans les querelles sur l'enseignement. Seul un grand effort spirituel peut nous permettre de transformer en une synthèse avantageuse ce qui ne serait autrement qu'un compromis affaiblissant. Il me semble que nos universités sont les centres tout désignés où peuvent s'élaborer de telles synthèses. Elles y travaillent déjà dans une certaine mesure, mais d'une façon trop peu consciente et trop peu ordonnée. Je voudrais que l'une de leurs fonctions explicites devint cette étude comparée des civilisations, à l'influence desquelles nous ne pouvons échapper: étude pour laquelle nous sommes l'un des peuples les mieux placés au monde. Il faut beaucoup absorber pour pouvoir rayonner. Le rôle des universités n'est-il pas d'intégrer dans la vie nationale tout ce que l'humanité produit de meilleur?

Bref, en plus d'exercer leurs fonctions ordinaires d'enseignement et de recherches, nos universités trouveraient grand avantage à exploiter à fond ce qui fait l'originalité de notre situation. C'est par là qu'elles pourraient s'assurer une prééminence sur certains points stratégiques, et retenir, pour son plus grand bien, l'attention du monde entier.

Mgr Alphonse-Marie Parent, C.S.,
Vice-Recteur et Secrétaire général.

① Le rôle de l'Université Cathol. dans le monde moderne (Plan) 1p.

② Article en anglais sur le même sujet : 9 pp. dactyl. - corrections à la main par

Mlle Gemma Parent, secrétaire de C.D.U.

Texte peut-être composé pour Mgr Parent -

Le rôle de l'Université Catholique dans le Monde Moderne

(Par Romana
Ingr. Pansier?)

1. L'Université comme école de savoir universel.
2. Finalité et hiérarchie des degrés du savoir — Sciences spécul. & pratiques.
3. L'Université catholique école de savoir universel.
 - a. ce qui caractérise l'Université catholique: l'implication positive de toutes les sciences, et leur hiérarchie. Pas de négations négatives.
 - b. Difficultés qui résultent de cette universalité:

{ universalité provisoire.
particularité provisoire.

α) au p^{er} degré intellectuel: il ne faut pas que les diverses sciences facultés empiètent sur le terrain des autres. Souvent à lutter contre fausse idée de liberté.

β) au p^{er} degré matériel: diff. et sacrifices financiers à faire pour un si vaste ensemble.
4. L'Université catholique et le monde.
 - a. d'idéal du monde et pratique et temporel. Il faut cela dans une certaine mesure.
 - b. Mais l'Université, comme son nom m l'indique, n'est pas qu'au service d'une destinée humaine.
 - c. de là l'incompréhension du monde en ce qui regarde l'universalité.
5. L'Université catholique et la liberté intellectuelle.
 - a. ce qu'on entend aujourd'hui par liberté.
 - b. des contradictions de cette liberté, en plus d'être une négation de la science. On veut la liberté vis-à-vis du nécess. et essentiel, et le déterminisme circa contingent.
 - c. ce que nous entendons par liberté.
6. La primauté de la science.
 - a. La science et l'objet-mesure.
 - b. l'art et le sujet-mesure.
 - c. L'Université cath. accorde la primauté à l'objet, à la science; les conceptions qui diffèrent de la nôtre l'accorde à l'art.
7. Dogme et Théologie.
 - a. ce qui a sauvé cette attitude devant l'objet: c'est l'Eglise avec son idéal catholique. Ex. tirés de l'histoire.
 - b. des attaques que doit subir l'univ. cath., quant à ce qui incarne son idéal, typ. fondées là-dessus.
8. Son rôle: sauvegarder la science et la liberté.

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A Catholic University must be primarily dedicated to that Wisdom which cannot be acquired by mere learning. Strictly speaking, the pursuit of learning and the knowledge of truth, in whatever department, are good. Yet, inquisitiveness becomes vain curiosity, and learning turns to folly, when we neglect or ignore that universal order ^{that natural hierarchy} of objects and aims which ~~is~~ ^{is} the very ^{subject} ~~object~~ of wisdom. We have today more knowledge of some facets of natural things, greater skill and power over nature, than was dreamt of even a few decades ago. Such knowledge might be wholesome even if men continued to know ^{at least} ~~only~~ as much about man as ^{was} ~~had been~~ known for ages; and the power it bestows could ^{also} be ^{a blessing} ~~beneficial~~ if we showed more concern for what is best in our own nature, and were ~~we~~ ^{even} more intent upon what is better than ⁿ man. We ^{are all conscious, to be sure, of} ~~can hardly fail to know~~ the scorn this truth must provoke. Mediaevalism is the epithet. Yet there are some truths which no derision should ^{be allowed to} ~~silence~~. When the Apostles told our Lord that the Pharisees were scandalized at His word, the answer was: "Let them say what they will." (Mt. 15/14) Even the ancient philosophers ~~had~~ professed the harsh

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formulated
truth, expressed by St. Augustine in his treatise
De Doctrina Christiana. In connection with the
science of number, he says: "The man, however,
who puts so high a value on these things as to
be inclined to boast himself one of the learned;
and who does not rather inquire after the source
from which those things which he perceives to be
true derive their truth, and from which those
others which he perceives to be unchangeable
also derive their truth and unchangeableness,
and who, mounting up from bodily appearances
to the mind of man, and finding that it too is
changeable (for it is sometimes instructed, at
other times uninstructed), although it holds a
middle place between the unchangeable truth above
it and the changeable things beneath it, does
not strive to make all things redound to the
praise and love of the one God from whom he

knows that all things have their being:—

the man, I say, who acts in this way may seem
to be learned, but wise he cannot in any sense

be deemed." (Book II, chapt. 38) — In the

De Moribus Ecclesiae he adds: "Some there are
who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God
is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever
remains the same, imagine they are doing some-
thing great, if with surpassing curiosity and

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keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue." (Chapt. 21) We now know such pursuit of purely material knowledge, unbalanced by a concern for things divine may spell even physical disaster.

We have so explored "this body we call the world," that we at last have that control over the organic and the inorganic, over pestilence and fire, that may blast mankind right out of it. The heart of every thinking man is filled with just alarm. Yet, this knowledge and power are cause for ~~alarm~~ ^{fear} only because men are distrustful of themselves.

For the foundation of this uneasiness and foreboding which ^{lurks} in every modern mind is not to be sought in the knowledge itself nor in the skill itself which have been achieved. Knowledge or skill are not worthless or evil merely because they may be put to evil use. No, our fear rises from the depths of the mind itself, from the sense that it has cut itself adrift, betrayed itself, and now feels helpless to prevent the catastrophe towards

which it is driving.

Such a terrifying humiliation as this
could only be the consequence of ^{that} ~~the~~ sin of pride
which has expressed itself for generations in
the modern claim of absolute freedom for human
Reason.



Man demanded the right to hold himself supreme lord and master, to recognize nothing higher than the conscience of man, to establish for himself, in all fields, what is right and what is wrong — and at the same moment was obliged to grant to others this privilege which he considered sacred. Into such ^a delusion it was easy for him to fall and easier for him to persist, not only because it answered to his self-esteem, but because, being partly founded in truth, it led immediately to such impressive results, liberating him from certain unjust restraints in the political order as well as making possible great material prosperity. In certain fields, freedom of thought, or better, divergence of opinion, is both legitimate and necessary. But it is a sophism, and a fatal sophism, to maintain that the complete liberty which is the mind's privilege in certain fields can be so extended as to render totally without consequence the most opposite views concerning the nature and destiny of man — a being whose almost every action has an effect on his neighbour. As soon as this is done, brutal ignorance itself will inevitably be the tyrant, subjugating all in the name of freedom. In

the words of the poet Heine, written more than a century ago: "There may be only one flock then and one shepherd—one free shepherd with an iron staff, and a shorn-alike, bleating-alike human herd." (Journal, 1842)

The deadliness of the error is manifest in the pitiful frustration to which it reduces men of good will, and the savage unscrupulosity it encourages in the wicked. Indeed, were it not for the gravity of the situation, we might even smile at the pathetic indignation, the anxious protests of the liberal spirits of our day at the crimes of foreign regimes. What is fantastic is that these liberal minds pay so little heed to the basic conceptions concerning life, man and happiness which inspire the methods and conduct of the men they most fear. They seem to have forgotten the sacred rights of falsehood which they themselves have vindicated for so long. They seem unconscious of the logic which should compel them to admit that if a man has a right to think as he pleases, he also has the right to act as he pleases; and indeed has the right to think, speak and act in order to destroy that very right itself.

If he holds that, for every man, tomorrow it shall be as if he had never been, if he be convinced that man is no better than a dog, it is futile to protest when he treats him like a dog. The right to think divorced from the right to act is meaningless.

And while the good can do no more than voice their unreasoned protests, the wicked grow ever stronger and more merciless. But here in the opposing camp the strange and fatal contradiction reappears, for it is ⁱⁿ the name of freedom, and with the word freedom on their lips that these men submit to slavery and impose it on others. The delusion, indeed, becomes colossal; brutality calls itself love of mankind; total destruction is accepted as the first step towards reconstruction; in the interests of the masses millions of the masses are herded to imprisonment or death.

If man were outright insane, could any final state to which his own cherished notions might lead him, be more utterly contradictory and meaningless than this? The emancipation of reason, which was to bring men a life more splendid than they had ever known,

has come to a close in

".....a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing."

I have spoken throughout as if our role in this tragedy of civilisation were that of spectators. This is surely not the impression I wish to leave. Although by human standards we might appear too few and too weak to change the course of this universal march to destruction, even by human standards we would be the most wretched and contemptible of men if, possessing any means of rescue for our fellow man, we were not ready to struggle to make such means prevail. But the Catholic University does not see these matters with the eyes of the world, and indeed would deny the very reason of its existence if it did. We know this is still God's world: a world redeemed, and a world overcomes. The will of God is plain, the ultimate victory certain. Our business is to do our duty with all our mind and strength. What is that duty? It is to study and to spread the knowledge of what is best in man and better than man; to see that in the instruction of our students Christian doctrine is proportioned to their knowledge

of science and art. However difficult it may be to achieve this balance, it must be our immediate and persistent aim.

"Be sure of this, that in the world's last age there are perilous times coming. Men will be in love with self, in love with money, boastful, proud, abusive; without reverence for their parents, without gratitude, without scruple, without love, without peace; slanderers, incontinent, strangers to pity and to kindness; treacherous, reckless, full of vain conceit, thinking rather of their pleasures than of God. They will preserve all the outward form of religion, although they have long been strangers to its meaning. [...] I adjure thee in the sight of God, and of Jesus Christ, who is to be the judge of living and dead, in the name of his coming, and of his kingdom, preach the word, dwelling upon it continually, welcome or unwelcome; bring home wrong-doing, ...with all the patience of a teacher." (ad Tim., 11-111)